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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case arises from the February 26, 1993, terrorist 
detonation of an explosive device under the World Trade 
Center in New York City, which caused six deaths, many 
injuries and massive property damage. Plaintiff-appellant, 
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owner of 
the World Trade Center, sued defendants, manufacturers of 
fertilizer products, on theories of negligence and products 
liability, alleging that the terrorists used defendants' 
fertilizer products to construct the explosive device. 
 
The District Court, in a thorough and well-reasoned 
opinion, granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff appealed. We find that it was 
appropriate, in light of the record, for the District Court to 
dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, we 
agree with the District Court that as a matter of law 
defendants owed no duty to plaintiff and that the World 
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Trade Center bombing was not proximately caused by 
defendants' actions. Furthermore, we reject plaintiff's 
argument that the issues of duty and proximate causation 
were jury issues not properly decided by the court on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is the 
owner of the World Trade Center in New York City. On 
February 26, 1993, a bomb, which had been fabricated by 
terrorists out of ammonium nitrate, urea, and nitric acid, 
exploded in an underground parking garage at the World 
Trade Center, causing six deaths, many injuries and 
massive property damage. 
 
The ammonium nitrate, urea, and nitric acid used in the 
bomb were allegedly sold in New Jersey, and the bomb was 
allegedly assembled in New Jersey by New Jersey residents. 
Defendants Hydro-Agri North America, Inc., and Dyno 
Nobel Inc., formerly known as Ireco, Inc., are alleged to 
have manufactured, designed, marketed, distributed 
and/or sold the ammonium nitrate used by the terrorists. 
Defendant Arcadian Corporation is alleged to have 
manufactured, designed, marketed, distributed and/or sold 
the urea used by the terrorists. 
 
The ammonium nitrate and urea, alleged to have been 
purchased by the terrorists, were sold in prill form, i.e., a 
white, round, hardened droplet about the size of the tip of 
a ball point pen. The prills were manufactured to be used 
as fertilizer. The ammonium nitrate prills can be rendered 
explosive by the addition of fuel oil or other sensitizing 
substances; the urea prills can be rendered explosive by the 
addition of nitric acid and water (forming urea nitrate). The 
terrorists are alleged to have rendered the prills explosive 
by adding these substances. Defendants point out that, as 
conceded in the Amended Complaint, the prills are not 
explosive in and of themselves. 
 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants knew or should have 
known that the ammonium nitrate and urea could easily be 
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made into explosives and that terrorists had used them 
prior to the bombing at the World Trade Center, but 
nevertheless defendants failed to take appropriate steps to 
render their products non-detonable. Specifically, plaintiff 
points to two incidents. First, an explosion of ammonium 
nitrate over fifty years ago destroyed two ships docked at 
Texas City, Texas, killing 468 persons and causing 
extensive damage in the city. Second, more than thirty 
years ago, anti-war protesters used ammonium nitrate to 
bomb the Mathematics Research Building at the University 
of Wisconsin, leading to injuries, death and property 
damage. 
 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants had the means to reduce 
the danger of their products. In 1968, Samuel Porter 
patented a process that rendered ammonium nitrate 
fertilizers non-detonable. The process called for adding five 
to ten percent of diammonium phosphate, a high grade of 
fertilizer, to ammonium nitrate at a nominal additional 
cost. When the patent was made available to ammonium 
nitrate manufacturers, one of the explicit purposes was to 
deter the criminal use of ammonium nitrate in bombs. In 
1985, the Porter patent entered the public domain, making 
the process available to all manufacturers free of license or 
royalty. 
 
Plaintiff alleges that the danger of these products 
prompted governments here and abroad to attempt to 
regulate their manufacture and distribution. Specifically, in 
response to the University of Wisconsin bombing, several 
states introduced legislation to require that all ammonium 
fertilizers be desensitized by a chemical agent (as described 
in the Porter patent) to reduce, if not eliminate, the 
explosive properties of ammonium nitrate. The legislative 
efforts were allegedly well publicized, including within the 
fertilizer industry, but plaintiff asserts that various fertilizer 
manufacturers resisted the legislation, leading to its 
ultimate defeat. 
 
In addition, in 1975, the European Economic Community 
Council issued a directive that established (1) strict 
standards for the formulation of solid ammonium nitrate 
and (2) detonation tests that could be required by member 
countries to ensure that fertilizer sold in those countries 
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had a low potential for use as explosive. Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands prohibited the sale of certain 
ammonium nitrate fertilizers. France mandated that all 
ammonium nitrate fertilizer be tested by detonation. 
 
Three years prior to the EEC directive, terrorist bombings 
in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland prompted 
the United Kingdom and Ireland to enact regulations that 
were even more stringent. Those regulations limited the 
amount of nitrate that could be used in fertilizer products 
and required the addition of calcium, sulfates, and other 
materials to reduce their detonability. 
 
Information about urea and the means to desensitize it 
was allegedly similarly well known, yet not utilized, prior to 
the World Trade Center bombing. It was allegedly known 
that the addition of phosphate and other additives to urea 
prills would decrease or eliminate their use as explosive 
and energetic materials. Explosives made of urea nitrate 
were allegedly used in the Middle East, South America, 
Pakistan and the United States prior to the World Trade 
Center bombing. In 1992, the sales of urea and ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer were banned in Peru as a result of the 
extensive use of urea and ammonium nitrate prills in 
explosives set off by the Shining Path terrorists. 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
Plaintiff filed this action on February 26, 1996, in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey in Essex County. Defendants 
removed the actions to the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey on the grounds of diversity of 
citizenship. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint before 
defendants responded to the original Complaint, in order to 
correct the name of one of the defendants. 
 
The Amended Complaint asserts three grounds for 
holding defendants liable. Count I, a claim of negligence, 
asserts that defendants "negligently failed to design, 
manufacture, market, distribute and/or sell [ammonium 
nitrate or urea prills] with a formulation" that would either 
"render them less detonable or non-detonable" or "decrease 
or eliminate their explosive properties." Count II, a claim in 
strict liability, asserts that defendants are liable because 
the ammonium nitrate and urea prills were "unreasonably 
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dangerous and defective when they left the respective 
control of each of the Defendants." Count III asserts that 
defendants are liable because they "failed to provide 
guidelines, instructions, and/or warnings to their 
distributors, retailers, dealers or other suppliers to confirm 
that buyers in the general and unrestricted public market 
have legitimate and lawful purposes for use of Defendants' 
products." 
 
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion and 
dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. See Port Authority 
of New York & New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 991 F. Supp. 
390 (D.N.J. 1997). Plaintiff filed a timely appeal. 
 
II. Analysis 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review of a district court order 
dismissing a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) is 
plenary. Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1397 (3d 
Cir. 1997). The court "must determine if plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the 
pleadings, assuming the truth of all the factual allegations 
in the complaint." Id. (citations omitted). "A court may 
dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be 
granted under any set of facts that could be proven 
consistent with the allegations." Id. 
 
B. Jurisdiction 
 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1332. Because this is an appeal from a final 
order of the District Court, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
C. Choice of Law 
 
As an initial matter, the District Court found it was not 
necessary to make a determination whether New York or 
New Jersey law applies to the Amended Complaint. Instead, 
the District Court determined that the Amended Complaint 
failed to state a claim under the law of either state. The 
District Court's approach was appropriate. A federal court 
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sitting in diversity applies the choice of law principles of the 
forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 
487, 496-97 (1941). Under New Jersey law, when the same 
result -- dismissal of a complaint -- is required under the 
laws of all relevant jurisdictions, the court need not decide 
which law would apply to the action. See Rohm & Haas Co. 
v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Mueller v. Parke-Davis, 599 A.2d 950, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991). Because we agree that dismissal is 
required under both New Jersey and New York law, we 
similarly need not decide the choice of law issue. 
 
D. The District Court's Application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) 
 
We first address plaintiff's argument that the District 
Court erred in failing to recognize the legal sufficiency of 
the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). Plaintiff argues that, although the District Court 
quoted the correct standard under Rule 12(b)(6), it 
misapplied it to the case. In essence, plaintiff contends that 
the Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to plead the 
elements of the causes of action (under either jurisdiction) 
but that the District Court elected to conclude that a jury 
could not rule in favor of plaintiff under any set of facts 
consistent with the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff argues 
that this ruling was premature and inconsistent with the 
mandate that the District Court must interpret allegations 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues 
that, in dismissing the complaint, the District Court made 
rulings on factual issues of foreseeability and proximate 
cause, which are traditionally the province of the jury. In 
sum, plaintiff claims that the District Court exceeded its 
limited role in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint and 
that plaintiff is entitled to discovery and to present evidence 
to a jury because the allegations in the Amended Complaint 
are sufficient. 
 
We find, however, that the District Court applied the 
standard correctly. Thus, the District Court assumed that 
the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint were true but 
determined that the facts, even if true, could not legally 
support plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff disagrees with this 
conclusion in two respects. First, plaintiff contends that the 
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District Court's task was merely to go through a check list 
for the elements of a tort claim. Consequently, since the 
Amended Complaint contained all the elements of the 
causes of action pled, the motion to dismiss should have 
been denied. Rule 12(b)(6), however, is designed to screen 
out cases where "a complaint states a claim based upon a 
wrong for which there is clearly no remedy, or a claim 
which the plaintiff is without right or power to assert and 
for which no relief could possibly be granted . . .." Melo- 
Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856, 859 (3d Cir. 1965) 
(quoting Leiman v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 108 
F.2d 302, 305-06 (8th Cir. 1940)). We find that the District 
Court carried out this mandate by taking all the allegations 
in the Amended Complaint as true and making every 
favorable inference in favor of plaintiff but deciding 
nevertheless that no relief could be granted.2 
 
Second, we disagree with plaintiff's insistence that the 
District Court misapplied Rule 12(b)(6) by considering 
whether plaintiff's claims were sufficient as a matter of 
"fairness" or "sound policy." Plaintiff argues that such 
considerations improperly substituted the court's views for 
those of the jury. Plaintiff, however, misunderstands the 
role of the courts in developing and administering the tort 
system. Tort law is essentially concerned with the 
"allocation of losses" arising out of "socially unreasonable 
conduct." Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts,S 1 at 6. The 
courts must consider not only the interests of the litigants 
but also the interests of society in general, including the 
social and economic costs of any expansion of the outer 
boundaries of tort liability. Id. This consideration 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Plaintiff argues that District Court Judge Bassler indicated during 
oral 
argument that he believed that plaintiff would prevail if the case was 
presented to a jury. "Then at the end, I mean, I can't believe a jury not 
bringing recovery on the facts of this case." App. 172a, T30-23. This 
quote is taken out of context. Judge Bassler was asking counsel whether 
judicial economy would be served by having a Third Circuit opinion on 
the issue before investing tremendous resources and going to trial. In 
other words, the judge was speculating that a jury would probably find 
for plaintiff on the facts of the case at trial. He was not indicating 
that 
he believed a legal basis existed for it to do so. And in dismissing the 
case, he ruled as a matter of law that recovery was precluded. 
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necessarily involves considerations of social and public 
policy. Id. 
 
As we will explore more fully below, the legal bounds of 
duty and of proximate cause are aspects of tort law in 
which issues of fairness and public policy are particularly 
relevant. We conclude that the District Court properly 
considered questions of fairness and policy and made 
rulings of law on issues of reasonable foreseeability and 
proximate causation. Moreover, a jury would be asked to 
determine if a duty had been violated or if the harm in 
question had been proximately caused by the defendants 
only after the court had determined as a matter of law 
either that defendants did have a duty to safeguard plaintiff 
from the risk of these bombs or that the defendants' 
supplying the terrorists with a component of these bombs 
was a legal proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. Because 
the District Court found as a matter of law that there was 
no duty and no proximate causation, there was nothing for 
a jury to consider. 
 
E. Duty 
 
The District Court properly concluded that the Amended 
Complaint failed to establish the existence of a duty owed 
by defendants. Under both New Jersey and New York law, 
the question of whether a duty is owed is a question of law 
to be decided by the court. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy 
Mem'l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 349 (N.J. 1988) ("The question 
of whether a duty exists is a matter of law properly decided 
by the court. . . ."); Purdy v. Public Adm'r , 526 N.E.2d 4, 6 
(N.Y. 1988) ("The question of whether a member or group of 
society owes a duty of care to reasonably avoid injury to 
another is of course a question of law for the courts."). 
 
Under the law of either jurisdiction, it is appropriate for 
us to focus on product liability principles in determining if 
defendants did owe plaintiff a duty. Under New Jersey law 
negligence is no longer viable as a separate claim for harm 
caused by a defective product. Oquendo v. Bettcher Indus., 
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Tirrell v. 
Navistar Int'l, Inc., 591 A.2d 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1991)). Even though plaintiff alleges a negligence claim in 
Count I, this count is based solely on harm caused by 
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defendants' allegedly defective products. It therefore falls 
within the New Jersey Product Liability Act (the"NJPLA"), 
N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 et seq., which is "the sole basis of relief 
under New Jersey law available to consumers injured by a 
defective product." Repola v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 934 F.2d 
483, 492 (3d Cir. 1991). Similarly, under New York law, 
theories of negligence and strict liability for design and 
warning defects are functionally equivalent. Elsroth v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 158 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (citing DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 
762, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), and Cooley v. Carter-Wallace, 
Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (App. Div. 1984)). A"plaintiff 
can recover nothing in negligence on his products claims 
that he cannot first recover under his strict liability claims 
asserting product, design, and warning defects." Id. at 158. 
 
We find that defendants owed no duty to plaintiff under 
either New Jersey or New York law. First, the manufacturer 
of a raw material or component part that is not itself 
dangerous has no legal duty to prevent a buyer from 
incorporating the material or the part into another device 
that is or may be dangerous. By plaintiff's own allegations, 
defendants' products were not in and of themselves 
dangerous but were merely the raw materials or 
components that terrorists used in combination with other 
ingredients to build a bomb. Second, manufacturers have 
no duty to prevent a criminal misuse of their products 
which is entirely foreign to the purpose for which the 
product was intended. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court examined the duties of a 
component manufacturer in Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 
675 A.2d 620 (N.J. 1996). In that case, the plaintiff was 
injured when hot water and carbon overflowed from a 
quench tank he was attempting to unclog. The quench tank 
was a component part of a coffee bean decaffeination 
process. The defendant, who had manufactured the quench 
tank, knew from designs that, once integrated into the 
larger system, the tank would need certain safety devices. 
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
component part manufacturer owed the plaintiff no duty 
regarding any danger posed by the integrated device, 
stating that a component part fabricator may only be held 
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"strictly liable for injury caused by a defective component 
where the defect is in the component part and the part did 
not undergo substantial change after leaving the 
manufacturer's hands." Id. at 636.3 The court relied on a 
tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, in which 
the American Law Institute "concluded that a component 
part manufacturer generally is not liable unless the 
component part is defective or the component provider 
substantially participated in the design of thefinal 
product." Id. at 629. The court also followed the "majority 
of courts from other jurisdictions [which] have held that a 
manufacturer of a component part, which is not dangerous 
until it is integrated by the owner into a larger system, 
cannot be held strictly liable to an injured employee for the 
failure of the owner and/or assembler to install safety 
devices." Id. 
 
In the instant case, there is no allegation that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We disagree with the District Court's conclusion that New Jersey has 
rejected the component part doctrine. See Port Authority, 991 F. Supp. at 
400. The District Court relied on Zaza's reference to Michalko v. Cooke 
Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179 (N.J. 1982), in which the court had 
held that a manufacturer of a component party must add a safety device 
if it is feasible. The court in Zaza, however, explained that "[a] further 
requirement for the imposition of strict liability on a component part 
fabricator is that the component part reach the user without substantial 
change. Where a component part is subject to further processing, or 
where the causing of the injury is not directly attributable to any defect 
in the component part, the fabricator is typically not subject to strict 
liability." Zaza, 675 A.2d at 629 (citation omitted). By contrast, in 
Michalko, the court held that there was no substantial change to the 
defendant's product, because its defect (the failure to add a safety 
device) 
was "untouched and remained unaffected by" the subsequent work on 
the machine. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 186. In the instant case, it is 
undisputed that the fertilizer products underwent substantial change 
after leaving defendants' hands. 
 
The two other cases relied on by the District Court did not involve raw 
materials or component parts, but rather, purchasers who had removed 
safety devices from the defendants' finished products. See Port Authority, 
991 F. Supp. at 400 (citing Oquendo, 939 F. Supp. at 362 (removal of 
point-of-operation guard and rewiring to bypass interlock mechanism); 
and Brown v. United States Stove Co., 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (N.J. 
1984) (purchaser removed safety valves from space heater)). 
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fertilizer products were dangerous in and of themselves. 
Under plaintiff's own allegations, the raw ammonium 
nitrate and urea sold by defendants were not explosive until 
the terrorists purposefully manipulated and adulterated 
them by mixing them together with additional chemicals 
such that they were transformed into energized materials 
that could be incorporated into an explosive charge. The 
danger to plaintiff was presented not by the raw materials, 
but by a bomb that incorporated the raw materials after 
they had been substantially altered. In addition, defendants 
had no control over the fertilizer once it was sold and no 
control over the final assembly of the bomb. 
 
Moreover, under the NJPLA, a plaintiff must prove"that 
the product causing the harm was not reasonablyfit, 
suitable or safe for its intended purpose." N.J.S.A. 2A:58C- 
2 (emphasis added); see also Zaza, 675 A.2d at 627 (stating 
that a "manufacturer has a duty to ensure that the 
products its places into the stream of commerce are safe 
when used for their intended purposes"). The 
"unforeseeable misuse of a product may not give rise to 
strict liability." Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Mach. Co., 
406 A.2d 140, 144 (N.J. 1979). "A product is not in a 
defective condition when it is safe for normal consumption 
and handling." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
S 402A cmt. h). Where "the use of the product is beyond its 
intended or reasonably anticipated scope," an injury 
resulting from that use is "not . . . probative of whether the 
product was fit, suitable, and safe." Id. There is no 
allegation here that the fertilizer products were unsafe for 
their intended purposes, that is, when used as fertilizer. 
 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that defendants should be 
liable nonetheless because the New Jersey courts have held 
that a manufacturer's duty also encompasses objectively 
foreseeable misuses and alterations. See Oquendo, 939 F. 
Supp. at 362 (D.N.J. 1996) ("New Jersey courts have held 
manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's 
subsequent substantial alterations, where those alterations 
were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injuries."); 
Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (N.J. 
1993) ("Hence, the plaintiff in a design-defect products 
liability suit may succeed even if the product was misused, 
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as long as the misuse or alteration was objectively 
foreseeable."); Soler v. Castmaster, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 
(N.J. 1984) ("Thus, in the event of either a substantial 
alteration or misuse, the manufacturer will be responsible 
for resultant injuries to an operator if the alteration or 
misuse implicated in the actual use of the machine was 
foreseeable and could have been prevented or reduced by 
the manufacturer."). 
 
We conclude, however, that the alteration and misuse of 
defendants' fertilizer products were not objectively 
foreseeable. We reject, therefore, plaintiff's attempt to hold 
defendants liable under this theory. The court in Oquendo 
set forth New Jersey law as follows: 
 
       Objective foreseeability means reasonable 
       foreseeability. The standard "does not affix 
       responsibility for future events that are only 
       theoretically, remotely, or just possibly foreseeable, or 
       even simply subjectively foreseen by a particular 
       manufacturer." . . . Rather it "applies to those future 
       occurrences that, in light of the general experience 
       within the industry when the product was 
       manufactured, objectively and reasonably could have 
       been anticipated." 
 
Oquendo, 939 F. Supp. at 362 (quoting Brown v. United 
States Stove Co., 484 A.2d 1234, 1241 (N.J. 1984)). 
Significantly, the fact that plaintiff alleges that defendants 
were aware of previous instances in which fertilizer 
products were used in bombs does not suffice to establish 
objective foreseeability. "Such knowledge . . . tends to show 
only subjective foreseeability, and . . . subjective 
foreseeability is irrelevant to the [objective] foreseeability 
determination." Id. at 363. 
 
Plaintiff argued below, and again on appeal, that the 
issues of objective foreseeability and reasonableness should 
be left for a jury to decide. We recognize that these issues 
are indeed generally a matter to be determined by a jury. 
See Soler, 484 A.2d at 1234. An exception is to be made, 
however, where "the inferences are so clear that a court can 
say as a matter of law that a reasonable manufacturer 
could not have foreseen the change." Id. (quoting 
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parenthetically Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co. , 636 F.2d 42, 
45 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding 
Wheel Co., 310 A.2d 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)). 
 
The inferences in this case are indeed so clear that we 
can say as a matter of law that the transformation and 
integration of the otherwise safe fertilizer products into the 
type of explosive device used in the World Trade Center 
bombing was not objectively foreseeable to the defendants 
at the time of this bombing. We agree with the District 
Court's conclusion that: 
 
       No jury could reasonably could conclude that one 
       accidental explosion 50 years ago, one terrorist act in 
       this country almost 30 years ago, and scattered 
       terrorists incidents throughout the world over the 
       course of the last 30 years would make an incident like 
       the World Trade Center bombing anything more than a 
       remote or theoretical possibility. 
 
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 991 F. Supp. at 
402-03. 
 
We, of course, must follow the precedents of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. DiBartolo, 
131 F.3d 343, 348 (3d Cir. 1997). The District Court's 
conclusion is consistent with the refusal of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court to impose a duty in cases involving 
outrageous misuses of a product wholly unrelated to its 
intended purpose, where such a duty would expose 
manufacturers to endless liability. See, e.g. , Jurado, 619 
A.2d at 1318 ("If . . . a plaintiff undertakes to use his power 
saw as a nail clipper and thereby snips his digits, he will 
not be heard to complain. . . .") (citation omitted); Suter, 
406 A.2d at 144 ("[T]he manufacturer of a knife cannot be 
charged with strict liability when the knife is used as a 
toothpick and the user complains because the sharp edge 
cuts."); see also Taylor v. General Elec. Co., 505 A.2d 190, 
193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding that bleach 
manufacturer had no duty to warn against using plastic 
Clorox bottles to carry gasoline because such a duty would 
cover an infinite variety of misuses). 
 
We agree with the District Court that imposing a duty on 
defendants in this case would be unfair. "Ultimately, the 
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determination of the existence of a duty is a question of 
fairness and public policy. Foreseeability of injury to 
another is important, but not dispositive. Fairness, not 
foreseeability alone, is the test." Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park 
Apartments, Inc., 688 A.2d 1018, 1020 (N.J. 1997). Indeed, 
it would be grossly unfair to impose a duty on defendants 
to anticipate and prevent the use of their products as one 
part of a terrorist's explosive device. Their products were 
not explosive in and of themselves, without being mixed 
with other substances and incorporated into a bomb. 
 
Finally, imposing a duty in this case would expand the 
scope of manufacturers' liability under New Jersey law, a 
result contrary to the legislative policy of the NJPLA, which 
"has been interpreted as evincing a legislative policy to limit 
the expansion of products-liability law." Zaza, 675 A.2d at 
627 (internal quote marks omitted). We leave such an 
expansion of duty to the legislature. 
 
Similarly, under New York law, we find that no duty 
exists that would provide a basis for liability. The 
manufacturer of a component part is not liable for the ways 
in which a purchaser subsequently processes or integrates 
that product. In Munger v. Heider Mfg. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 
271, 273 (App. Div. 1982), the court held that 
manufacturers of component parts, not themselves 
defectively designed, could not be liable to one injured by 
the malfunction of the assembled unit. Indeed, under New 
York law, a manufacturer is not liable where its product 
became dangerous only due to substantial alteration even 
if the product is not a component part or raw material. In 
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 
N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. 1980), the New York Court of 
Appeals held that "a manufacturer of a product may not be 
cast in damages, either on a strict products liability or 
negligence cause of action, where, after the product leaves 
the possession and control of the manufacturer, there is a 
subsequent modification which substantially alters the 
product and is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." 
In Robinson, the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to 
hold a machine manufacturer liable for an injury caused 
because safety guards were removed, saying "[m]aterial 
alterations at the hands of a third party which work a 
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substantial change in the condition in which the product 
was sold . . . are not within the ambit of the manufacturer's 
responsibility." Id. at 444. 
 
Another New York case, Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 
700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), also establishes that a 
manufacturer cannot be held liable for failing to add a 
safety device to its product to prevent other substances 
from being combined with it. In that case, an individual 
laced Tylenol capsules with cyanide and replaced the 
deadly product on store shelves, causing a consumer to die 
after ingesting the capsules. Id. at 153-54. Thus, like the 
instant case, Elsroth concerned a criminal who injured a 
victim by adulterating the defendant's product. The plaintiff 
alleged that the manufacturer could have prevented the 
death by producing the drug in caplet form, which would 
have made it more difficult for a criminal to adulterate the 
product. Id. at 160, 163. The court rejected this argument, 
holding that "there exists no common law duty requiring . 
. . manufacturers to design their product in such a way as 
to anticipate and frustrate criminal tampering." Id. at 164. 
 
This limiting principle is not altered even if the misuse of 
the product might be foreseeable. In Elsroth, the 
defendant's product had been tampered with in the same 
way four years earlier. Id. at 153. Similarly, in Robinson, 
the court concluded that the machine manufacturer had no 
duty to prevent disengagement of a safety device"however 
foreseeable that modification may have been." Robinson, 
403 N.E.2d at 444; see also McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger, and 
Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding as a 
matter of law that defendant, a manufacturer of 
ammunition, owed no duty to prevent the criminal misuse 
of ammunition, regardless of its foreseeability). 
 
On appeal, plaintiff attempts to distinguish these New 
York cases on their facts but fails to provide any reason 
why the principles and rules articulated in them are 
inapplicable to this case. Plaintiff relies exclusively on the 
proposition that a manufacturer has a duty to make its 
product safe when "used for its intended purpose or for an 
unintended but reasonably foreseeable purpose." Lugo v. 
LJN Toys, Ltd., 552 N.E.2d 162, 163 (N.Y. 1990); Micallef v. 
Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976). The fatal flaw 
 
                                17 
  
in the argument is that plaintiff ignores the more specific 
rule applicable here, that where a product has undergone 
substantial alteration after leaving the manufacturer's 
control and it is the alteration that creates the danger, the 
prevention of such alteration is not within the scope of the 
manufacturer's responsibility. Moreover, Lugo  and Micallef, 
the cases cited by plaintiff, are merely examples of a 
manufacturer making a product that was unsafe even when 
used precisely in the manner that the manufacturer 
anticipated. See Lugo, 552 N.E.2d at 163; Micallef, 348 
N.E.2d at 577. Neither case supports the imposition of 
liability on a manufacturer of fertilizer products, which are 
safe when used for their intended purposes but were 
rendered unsafe by terrorists who substantially altered the 
products so that they could be used for a violent purpose 
wholly foreign to their intended purposes. 
 
Because no duty exists under the law of either New 
Jersey or New York, we find that it was appropriate for the 
District Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
 
F. Proximate Causation 
 
The District Court also properly concluded that, under 
the law of either jurisdiction, defendants' actions or 
inactions were not the proximate cause of the World Trade 
Center bombing. 
 
As the District Court explained, the correct legal 
framework under New Jersey law is set forth in Zaza: 
 
       Utilization of [the] term [proximate cause] to draw 
       judicial lines beyond which liability will not be 
       extended is fundamentally . . . an instrument of 
       fairness and policy, although the conclusion is 
       frequently expressed in the confusing language of 
       causation, "foreseeability" and "natural and probable 
       consequences." Many years ago a case in this State hit 
       it on the head when it was said that the determination 
       of proximate cause by a court is to be based "upon 
       mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, 
       policy and precedent." 
 
Zaza, 675 A.2d at 635 (quoting Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 
222 A.2d 513, 517 (N.J. 1966)). 
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In another case, also cited by the District Court, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court provided the following guidance: 
 
       A negligent act is not necessarily a substantial factor or 
       proximate cause of an accident simply because it 
       contributed to the occurrence in the sense that absent 
       such an act the accident would not have transpired. 
       Rather, the critical consideration, in the context of 
       multiple factors contributing to the cause of the 
       accident, is whether the faulty act was itself too 
       remotely or insignificantly related to the accident. If it 
       can fairly be regarded as sufficiently remote or 
       insignificant in relation to the eventual accident then, 
       in a legal sense, such fault does not constitute"a 
       cause of the accident, . . . [but] simply presents the 
       condition under which the injury was received, . . .." 
 
Brown v. United States Stove Co., 484 A.2d 1234, 1243 
(N.J. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 
In Brown, the court also noted that, with regard to the 
subsequent alteration of a product, "if the original defect, 
although not the sole cause of the accident, constituted a 
contributing or concurrent proximate cause in conjunction 
with the subsequent alteration, the [original manufacturer] 
will remain liable." Id. at 1242. Furthermore, "[t]he critical 
factor in determining whether a subsequent substantial 
alteration of a product or its misuse can be attributed to a 
manufacturer as a proximate result of an original design 
defect under the risk-utility standard is `foreseeability.' " Id. 
at 1240. 
 
Plaintiff argued below and on appeal that the issue of 
proximate causation is for a jury to decide. The District 
Court properly recognized, however, that the court may 
conclude as a matter of law that defendants' actions were 
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury."The issue 
of responsibility for the highly extraordinary consequence is 
also a matter of law for the court." Griesenbeck v. Walker, 
488 A.2d 1038, 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); 
accord Caputzal, 222 A.2d at 518 ("The idea of non-liability 
for the highly extraordinary consequence as a matter of law 
for the court has already been recognized in this state."). 
Furthermore, even if the existence of a duty may not be 
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resolved as a matter of law, it may still be appropriate to 
decide the issue of proximate causation as a matter of law. 
See Brown, 484 A.2d 1244 (finding a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the existence of a duty, but 
granting summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause). The New Jersey courts have on many occasions 
held that proximate causation did not exist as a matter of 
law. See Griesenbeck, 488 A.2d at 1043; Jensen v. 
Schooley's Mountain Inn, Inc., 522 A.2d 1043, 1045 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Brown, 484 A.2d at 1244; 
Caputzal, 222 A.2d at 518. 
 
Similarly, under New York law, a defendant is not held 
liable for every conceivable consequence that might 
somehow be causally related to its conduct. See Dyer v. 
Norstar Bank, N.A., 588 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App. Div. 1992) 
("[C]onceivability is not the equivalent of foreseeability."); 
Van Valkenburgh v. Robinson, 639 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (App. 
Div. 1996) (holding no proximate cause where injury was 
possible, but not probable, result of negligence). As in New 
Jersey, courts use proximate cause to draw judicial lines to 
limit liability. See Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent a Car, 
Inc., 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149 (N.Y. 1978) ("What we do mean 
by the word `proximate' is, that because of convenience, of 
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily 
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point."). 
 
As the District Court recognized, in New York, as in New 
Jersey, "questions of whether an intervening act severs the 
chain of causation depend on the foreseeability of the 
intervening act and should be determined by thefinder of 
fact." McCarthy, 916 F. Supp. at 372 (citation omitted). 
"However, in appropriate circumstances, the court may 
resolve the issue as a matter of law. Those cases generally 
involve independent intervening acts which operate upon 
but do not flow from the original act." Id.  
 
We find the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Gaines-Tabb 
v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998), 
to be persuasive on the issue of proximate causation. In 
that case, the plaintiffs sued the alleged manufacturers of 
the fertilizer used in the Oklahoma City bombing. The 
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 
claim, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Although that case 
 
                                20 
  
was not decided under New York or New Jersey law, the 
principles and doctrines applied by the court are similar to 
those in the instant case. The court noted that causation 
was generally a question of fact, but that "the question 
becomes an issue of law when there is no evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably find the required proximate, 
causal nexus between the careless act and the resulting 
injuries." Id. at 620 (citation omitted). Applying the relevant 
state law, the court wrote: 
 
       [W]e hold that as a matter of law it was not foreseeable 
       to defendants that the [ammonium nitrate] that they 
       distributed to the Mid-Kansas Co-op would be put to 
       such a use as to blow up the Murrah Building. 
       Because the conduct of the bomber or bombers was 
       unforeseeable, independent of the acts of defendants, 
       and adequate by itself to bring about plaintiffs' 
       injuries, the criminal activities of the bomber or 
       bombers acted as the supervening cause of plaintiffs' 
       injuries. Because of the lack of proximate cause, 
       plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for negligence. 
 
Id. at 621. 
 
In the instant case, we similarly hold as a matter of law 
that the World Trade Center bombing was not a natural or 
probable consequence of any design defect in defendants' 
products. In addition, the terrorists' actions were 
superseding and intervening events breaking the chain of 
causation. Thus, we find that, under the law of either 
jurisdiction, the District Court was correct infinding the 
World Trade Center bombing was not proximately caused 
by defendants. Rather, it was caused by the terrorists' 
intentional acts to create an explosive device and to cause 
the harm to the World Trade Center and its occupants. 
Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that 
plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 
 
G. Failure to Warn 
 
The District Court dismissed plaintiff's failure to warn 
claims on two independent grounds: first, that defendants 
owed no duty to warn the middlemen; second, that plaintiff 
is unable to allege facts showing that such a warning would 
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have prevented the harm. We agree with the District Court 
on both theories. 
 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants owed a duty to warn the 
distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and other suppliers not 
to sell the fertilizers to customers without confirming "that 
buyers in the general and unrestricted public market have 
legitimate and lawful purposes for use of defendants' 
products." Essentially, plaintiff's claim is that defendants 
negligently marketed their products to the general public, 
not that defendants failed to warn users of the products' 
dangers. 
 
As the District Court noted, plaintiff cannot point to a 
single case that supports its theory. The parties have raised 
the issue of whether the New Jersey Products Liability Act 
acts as a bar to plaintiff's theory. The NJPLA requires only 
a warning "that communicates adequate information on the 
dangers and safe use of the product taking into account the 
characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, 
the persons by whom the product is intended to be used." 
N.J.S.A. S 2A:58C-4. Plaintiff argues that, because the 
NJPLA "is not intended to codify all the issues related to 
products liability," id. at S 2A:58C-1, there is no statutory 
bar. Defendants argue that, by requiring only warnings 
about intended uses, the statute precludes any additional 
duties to warn. Like the District Court, we see no need to 
resolve this question because no cases, even under the 
common law, support the existence of such a duty. The 
cases cited by plaintiff do not support its existence at all. In 
the first case, Parks v. Pep Boys, 659 A.2d 471 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1995), the plaintiff did not assert a failure to 
warn claim, nor did it sue the manufacturer at all. The 
second case, Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 
(N.J. 1993), only discusses the heeding presumption-- the 
presumption under New Jersey law that the plaintiff would 
have "heeded" the warning if the manufacturer had given 
one. Nothing in the opinion imposes a duty on 
manufacturers to warn their middlemen. Finally, Macrie v. 
SDS Biotech Corp., 630 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1993), does not support the existence of such a duty. That 
case involved the question whether the manufacturer has a 
duty to warn remote vendees. As the District Court 
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recognized in the instant case, plaintiff is not seeking to 
hold the defendants liable for failing to warn the terrorists 
of the dangers of the fertilizer products. 
 
Plaintiff's argument similarly fails under New York law. 
Plaintiff can cite no case establishing such a duty. The only 
case cited, Tucci v. Bossert, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 
1976) is not on point, as there is no allegation that 
defendants in this case failed to warn the party exposed to 
the harm -- here, the plaintiff. Furthermore, the suggestion 
in Tucci that the adequacy of a warning is a jury issue 
should not be taken to mean that the question of the 
existence of the duty is a jury issue. As we have seen, the 
existence of a duty is properly a question for the court. 
 
Thus, plaintiff can cite no authority (and we canfind 
none) under either New Jersey or New York law which 
supports the existence of a duty to warn middlemen that 
consumers, after purchasing their products, may alter the 
products and harm third parties. The District Court 
properly dismissed the failure to warn claim on this 
ground. See also Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d at 625 (holding 
that plaintiffs failed to state a failure to warn claim under 
Oklahoma law because "defendants had no duty to warn 
the suppliers of its product of possible criminal misuse"). 
 
In addition, we agree with the District Court that plaintiff 
is unable to allege facts showing that an adequate warning 
would have prevented the harm. The District Court 
observed correctly that under both New Jersey and New 
York law, a plaintiff must show proximate cause in a failure 
to warn claim. Under New Jersey law, "[i]n a product 
liability case plaintiff has the burden of proving that the 
failure to give adequate warnings was a proximate cause of 
the accident and injuries and that the failure was a 
substantial factor in bringing about the happening of the 
accident." Malin v. Union Carbide Corp., 530 A.2d 794, 799 
(N.J. App. Div. 1987). "If the basis for recovery under strict 
liability is inadequacy of warnings or instruction about 
dangers, then plaintiff would be required to show that an 
adequate warning or instruction would have prevented the 
harm." Id. (quoting Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
485 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1984) (quoting Keeton, Products 
Liability--Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398, 
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414 (1970))). New York law requires the same showing of 
proximate cause. See Elsroth, 700 F. Supp. at 166 ("Simply 
put, this tragedy would have occurred whether or not there 
had been a warning . . . , and the claim, therefore, must 
fail."). 
 
Applying this law, we agree with the District Court's 
reasoned elaboration of why the failure to warn claim must 
fail: 
 
       In light of the elaborate efforts the terrorists went 
       through to commit their heinous crime, it would defy 
       all logic, common sense, and fairness, the touchstones 
       of proximate causation, to presume that the World 
       Trade Center bombing would have been prevented had 
       Defendants warned their middlemen not to sell to 
       terrorists because terrorists might use the fertilizer to 
       create a bomb. Given the terrorists' obvious 
       determination, the Court cannot presume that even if 
       the middlemen heeded this warning, the terrorists' plan 
       would have been thwarted. 
 
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 991 F. Supp. at 
410. 
 
Thus, the District Court properly found that plaintiff's 
failure to warn claim must be dismissed because no 
reasonable jury could conclude that the crime could have 
been prevented by defendants' warnings to middlemen that 
the fertilizer could be criminally misused. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of the Amended Complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
 
                                24 
  
Hoeveler, District Judge, Concurring: 
 
I concur in the very well developed opinion of Judge 
Roth. I am, however, constrained to offer an observation 
which may bear the fruit of protection from further similar 
disasters. The precedential value of our decision, as well as 
that of the Tenth Circuit in Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 
USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998), rests largely on a 
slender and temporal reed: lack of foreseeability of the 
intervening criminal act. Whether experience and failure to 
use available safeguards will, in time, create new legal 
duties on the part of the manufacturer remains to be seen. 
We live in a society in which the disgruntled more and more 
resort to violence. Appellees' products, so easily convertible 
to dangerous qualities, need not -- with proper treatment 
-- become a part of that violence. 
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